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Resiling from Reconciling?
Musing on R. v. Kapp
Patricia Hughes*

I. INTRODUCTION
From the beginning, the Supreme Court of Canada has struggled
with how the often conflicting rights and freedoms under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 can be reconciled and with how to
balance the rights and freedoms with the limits under section 1. This has
not been an easy task and, not surprisingly, given the difficulty of the
challenge, the rhetoric of reconciliation and balancing has often been
stronger than its achievement. In R. v. Kapp,2 the majority gave
considerable power to section 15(2) of the Charter, giving it at the same
time a complementary but “independent” relationship with section 15(1),
and the minority awarded unanticipated authority to section 25. In each
case, concluding that the requirements of section 15(2) or section 25
have been met brings closure to the inquiry, while talk of reconciliation
is set to one side.
Kapp addresses four issues under the Charter that do require
clarification or development: the section 15(1) analysis (or what is the
status of Law?);3 the appropriate analysis of section 15(2); the related
question of how sections 15(1) and 15(2) interrelate; and the application
of section 25. The majority decision, written by the Chief Justice and
Abella J., is brisk, with little time spent on nuance. Justice Bastarache
takes the opportunity, although he does not need to do so, to provide a
definitive statement about the role of section 25, but he does so alone.
His minority opinion, focusing almost entirely on section 25, rambles,

*
Former Dean of Law at the University of Calgary and currently Executive Director of the
Law Commission of Ontario. The opinions expressed are those of the author.
1
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
[2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”].
3
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”].
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perhaps reflecting a compulsion to put his interpretation of section 25 on
record before it is too late.
Although the majority acknowledge the criticisms of Law, seeking to
carve a path through the underbrush of the various factors indicating
whether there has been an infringement of inequality, their own analysis
does not offer a great deal of guidance about the real place or meaning of
human dignity in the section 15 analysis. Rather, it seeks to resuscitate
the (in retrospect) easier earlier analysis in Andrews.4 Their analysis
under section 15(2) raises at least as many questions as it answers, such
as how to analyze section 15(2) when an affirmative action program is
challenged by another disadvantaged group, and in particular, by a group
more disadvantaged than the one the program targets, because it makes
that group‟s situation worse. The very status of the preference at the
heart of Kapp as an affirmative action program is highly debatable. It
was not addressed extensively by the parties during the hearing, and the
Crown did not rely on it to justify the program. 5 Similarly, the
characterization of Aboriginality as a form of “racialization” may be
strongly criticized. Identifying the distinction as based on race reflects an
outdated understanding of “race” as a classification.6
There is thus much to say about Kapp, but one issue that cuts across
these various matters is the willingness of both the majority and the
minority to allow some sections of the Charter to “trump” other sections,
closing or coming close to cutting off debate about whether the analysis
needs to be more complicated. It is this aspect of Kapp that I explore
here.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHARTER RIGHTS
1. Common Goal, Different Manifestations
The rights and freedoms under the Charter are directed towards
different goals, yet are also all reflective of full citizenship in a liberaldemocratic society. It has been said that they share a common subtext,
4
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”].
5
Sarah T. Kraicer, “R. v. Kapp: Aboriginal Fishing, Andrews, and Affirmative Action in
the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 25 N.J.C.L. 153 [hereinafter “Kraicer”]. Kraicer represented
the Attorney General of Canada in Kapp.
6
Sébastien Grammond, “Disentangling „Race‟ and Indigenous Status: The Role of Ethnicity”
(2008) 33 Queen‟s L.J. 487.
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the realization of human dignity, while they also come into conflict. For
example, freedom of religion and religious equality are both guaranteed
in different sections; other forms of equality are also protected, as is
freedom of expression. Yet all of these may be in tension with each
other: certain religious beliefs may include beliefs that to others reflect
the subordination of women; some kinds of expression may reflect
hostility to homosexuality or towards adherents of a particular faith. The
right to a fair trial might seem to demand disclosure of particular
evidence; to disclose the evidence, however, might seriously impair
privacy and equality rights. All of them may be limited by societal
interests and concerns that outweigh individual autonomy or warrant
restrictions on individual autonomy. Liberal democracies, and this may
be particularly true of Canada, want it all or, at least, they say they do:
they want everyone to enjoy their rights to the fullest. This is not
possible. Complete freedom of expression can be harmful to religious
freedom and to equality. Equality among religious beliefs, in the sense
that they are all treated as acceptable and open to being acted upon, may
run in the face of gender equality (equality on the basis of sexuality) or
the security of children, including their lives.
Realistically, the Charter as a whole represents a commitment to
certain principles and values that are woven in and among the rights and
freedoms. Even section 1‟s limitations are expected to reflect this, since a
“free and democratic society” includes the liberty to develop and realize
one‟s full potential, plan one‟s own life, make choices or be “eccentric”.7
It is also now accepted that, while human dignity is not a free-standing
right, “notions of human dignity underlie almost every right guaranteed
by the Charter”, perhaps taking different form in the various rights.8 In
Kapp, indeed, the majority goes further to say that “the protection of all
of the rights guaranteed by the Charter has as its lodestar the promotion
of human dignity”.9 This common underpinning helps weave a common
thread among the rights (and the operation of section 1). Were it easier to
define, not so susceptible to so many different contextualized meanings,
it might even be a way to address tensions between and among rights: the
answer to the question, “the exercise of which of these rights most
7

R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C.
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] S.C.J. No. 43, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 307, at para. 76 (S.C.C.), per Bastarache J.
9
Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 21 (emphasis added). The majority recognizes at para. 22
that the emphasis on human dignity in Law, supra, note 3, has “proven to be an additional burden on
equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement it was intended to be”.
8
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promotes human dignity?” (or “the exercise of which of these rights most
diminishes human dignity?” or “how do we reconcile them so that the
result is the most human dignity for everyone?”) might help us facilitate
the reconciliation. Human dignity simply is not manifested in the same
way, or even defined in the same way, for everyone, however. While
human dignity is useful conceptually, it is far more difficult to
operationalize, as has been evident post-Law.
2. Whether to Reconcile or Balance: That Is the Question
As former Justice Frank Iacobucci has said, “no Charter right is
absolute. A particular Charter right must be defined in relation to other
rights and with a view to the underlying context in which the apparent
conflict arises”.10 Furthermore, “there is no hierarchy of rights, nor
should one be inferred from Charter jurisprudence”. Accordingly, when
different rights claims arise in the same case, at the rights stage neither
one should take priority over the other; rather, they must be interpreted in
a way that protects all the interests, while recognizing that not all the
claims can be equally successful.11 He suggests that the process involved
in assessing the scope of rights in relation to each other is best described
as “reconciliation”, that is, an attempt to make the rights compatible with
each other. This is a different exercise from the “balancing” that occurs
under section 1 when one right or interest is given primacy over
another.12 Under section 1, the balancing may occur between different
rights (as when the court holds that section 2(b) encompasses hate
expression, but that this expression is balanced with — and loses to —
equality interests),13 but will always be framed as between a right and a
more general societal interest.
A similar process occurs under the Quebec Charter of Human Rights
and Freedoms,14 and some cases under the Quebec Charter, discussed
below, raise issues of relevance for Canadian Charter analysis. Section
9.1 of the Quebec Charter states that “[i]n exercising his fundamental
10
Frank Iacobucci, “„Reconciling Rights‟: The Supreme Court of Canada‟s Approach to
Competing Charter Rights” (2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137, at 139 [hereinafter “Iacobucci”].
11
In many cases, there may not actually be different claimants relying on different rights,
but the rights on which an individual relies may implicate other Charter rights that are recognized by
the court as worthy of consideration.
12
Iacobucci, supra, note 10, at 142.
13
R. v. Keegstra, [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Keegstra”].
14
R.S.Q., c. C-12 [hereinafter “Quebec Charter”].
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freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for
democratic values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens
of Québec.” Section 9.1 is a general limitation clause, but there is a
different tone to section 9.1, compared to the wording of section 1 under
the Canadian Charter. Section 9.1 indicates an expectation that
individuals will consider the impact of their exercise of rights on others.
Section 1 places the onus on the state to justify the limitations on rights;
in other words, individuals are to accept limitations imposed on them,
rather than to explore themselves how the exercise of their rights affects
others in the community. The idea of “reconciliation” opens up the idea
of “owning” the scope of rights in a particular context in a way that
respects the rights of others. It suggests the idea of “rights as
relationship”,15 rather than rights as individual “property”.
Some members of the Supreme Court of Canada have maintained
that the Charter does not provide for reconciling rights and that any
conflicts between or among rights must be addressed — and balanced —
through section 1, and certainly the Charter not only does not provide for
internal qualifications (with some exceptions), but does have the general
limitation provision.16 Nevertheless, the Court has found reconciliation
an attractive way to address the conflicts at the rights stage to save as
much of all the rights as possible, given the particular circumstances of
the case (something analogous, perhaps, to defining the scope of federal
and provincial constitutional powers?). The idea of reconciliation is
consistent with the view that no particular Charter rights are supposed to
be treated as if they are more important than other Charter rights. The
process is meant to define the rights so that it is not an all-or-nothing
proposition. On the other hand, it is not realistic that in all cases the
rights can be shaped in a way that everyone‟s interests are protected to
some degree. And depending on the way a right is defined, the practical
effect of reconciliation may be that one right is subordinated to another.

15
Jennifer Nedelsky, “Reconceiving Rights as Relationship”, in Jonathan Hart & Richard
W. Bauman, eds., Explorations in Difference: Law, Culture, and Politics (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1996) 67.
16
See, e.g., La Forest J. in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1994]
S.C.J. No. 24, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315, at para. 110 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “B. (R.)”]. Justice La Forest
believed that the state should bear the burden of justifying restricting freedom of religion. Justices
Iacobucci and Major contended at para. 233 that “[s]uch an approach elevates choosing to refuse
one‟s child necessary medical care on account of one‟s personal convictions to the level of
constitutionally protected activity.”
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Former Justice Iacobucci has suggested that B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid
Society of Metropolitan Toronto17 and, on the same analysis, Trinity
Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers18 are
“classic example[s] of definitional reconciliation”.19
In B. (R.), the explicit claim was the right of parents to make
decisions based on religious belief; but the decision at issue, to deny a
blood transfusion, affected a child and therefore the Court took into
account the section 7 security rights of the child. Three members of the
Court gave the child‟s security right sufficient weight that they defined
freedom of religion to exclude the right to refuse medical treatment in
these circumstances.20 One of the three, former Justice Iacobucci, has
since explained that “[b]y defining freedom of religion in this way, a
conflict between rights was avoided.”21 This approach is an exclusionary
way to avoid a conflict, an approach chosen by the three judges because
a child‟s life was at risk. It might also be the “right” result. One might
question, however, whether this is reconciliation.
The Court approached “context” somewhat differently in Trinity
Western.22 Trinity Western, a religious-based private educational
institution, wanted to offer by itself a teaching training program that it
had previously offered in conjunction with Simon Fraser University. The
College of Teachers denied its approval because Trinity Western
required students and teachers to sign a Community Standards document
that identified a number of “practices that are biblically condemned”,
including “homosexual behaviour”. The majority at the Supreme Court
of Canada acknowledged that the issue “is how to reconcile the religious
freedoms of individuals wishing to attend TWU with the equality
concerns of students in B.C.‟s public school system, concerns that may
be shared with their parents and society generally”. Any conflict, they
said, should be resolved through “the proper delineation of the rights and
values involved”,23 recognizing that that Charter must be read as a whole,
17

Id.
[2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Trinity Western”].
Iacobucci, supra, note 10, at 162.
20
For the analysis of Iacobucci and Major JJ., see B. (R.), supra, note 16, beginning at para.
212. They would have phrased the question to be determined to emphasize the child‟s right and
place the parents‟ freedom of religion in opposition to it: “to what extent can an infant‟s right to life
and health be subordinated to conduct emanating from a parent‟s religious convictions?”: id., at para.
225.
21
Iacobucci, supra, note 10, at 157.
22
Trinity Western, supra, note 18.
23
Id., at paras. 28 and 29.
18
19
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so that one right is not privileged at the expense of another”.24 They
concluded that the proper place “to draw the line” is between belief and
conduct, with the former being broader than the latter.25 Justices
Iacobucci and Bastarache observed that “[t]o state that the voluntary
adoption of a code of conduct based on a person‟s own religious beliefs,
in a private institution, is sufficient to engage s. 15 would be inconsistent
with freedom of conscience and religion, which co-exist with the right to
equality.”26
Although reconciling rights through the definitional exercise is an
admirable objective, it is difficult to do. And the end result is often not
much different from a section 1 analysis: one right takes priority over the
other. There are two major differences, however: one concerns the onus
and who should be responsible for justifying limits on rights; and the
other is that when reconciliation occurs at the rights stage, the other
rights in conflict have an equivalency to the initial right that was
claimed. Under section 1, the task involves placing limits on the exercise
of rights that has already received recognition. The two approaches are
illustrated by cases about obscenity or pornography and hate speech:
does the protection afforded by section 2(b) of the Charter extend to
these forms of expression, with the question of whether their impact
warrants denial of the exercise considered under section 1? Or is the need
for an actual assessment avoided by excluding these expressions from the
scope of section 2(b)? The Supreme Court held in each case that while
the particular form of expression was protected by section 2(b), it was
limited under section 1 by the equality rights of women and Jews,
respectively, and society‟s interest in the equality rights of citizens.27 In
Butler, the Manitoba Court of Appeal had divided on the question, with
the majority holding that pornography was not protected by section
2(b).28 In Keegstra, the Chambers Judge concluded that hate speech was
not protected by section 2(b).29 These lower court decisions are
24

Id., at para. 31.
Id., at para. 25.
26
Id. It does not appear to be relevant that while Trinity Western is a private school, it
wanted public approval of its program.
27
On obscenity, see R. v. Butler, [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (S.C.C.). On
hate speech, see Keegstra, supra, note 13, and Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996]
S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 (S.C.C.). Ross involved Ross‟s freedom of expression and freedom
of religion and his pupils‟ equality rights.
28
R. v. Butler, [1990] M.J. No. 519, 73 Man. R. (2d) 197 (Man. C.A.).
29
R. v. Keegstra, [1984] A.J. No. 643, 87 A.R. 200 (Alta. Q.B.). The Court of Appeal held
that the balancing was to be carried out under s. 1: R. v. Keegstra, [1988] A.J. No. 501, 60 Alta. L.R.
(2d) 1 (Alta. C.A.).
25
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consistent with reconciliation as applied by the three judges in B. (R.),
who held that freedom of religion did not encompass parents making
medical decisions that threatened the life of their child.
When reconciliation is carried out at the rights stage, the Court has
said that rights should be defined with the goal that they do not conflict
with one another, using a contextual approach.30 Different contexts may
result in different treatment of the rights vis-à-vis each other. Thus the
right to disclosure in criminal and civil cases that raise the right to a fair
trial and privacy and equality interests may result in different
“reconciliation” of these rights, since the accused‟s interest in a criminal
case is usually stronger than that of a plaintiff in a civil case.31
In Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, the Court gave short shrift to
the argument that recognizing same-sex marriages interfered with the
equality rights of religious groups opposed to same-sex marriage and
opposite-sex married couples, concluding that “[t]he mere recognition of
the equality rights of one group cannot, in itself, constitute a violation of
the rights of another. The promotion of Charter rights and values
enriches our society as a whole and the furtherance of those rights cannot
undermine the very principles the Charter was meant to foster.”32 On the
one hand, the Court avoided determining whether the proposed
legislation created an impermissible collision with freedom of religion
because it had not yet been enacted.33 On the other hand, the Court was
prepared to give its opinion on whether a compulsion on religious
officials opposed to same-sex marriage to perform civil same-sex
marriages would contravene their freedom of religion: “absent
exceptional circumstances” that they could not foresee, it would be
contrary to the Charter and could not be justified under section 1.34
(a) Section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter
The Quebec Charter cases are also relevant in understanding the
complexity of the exploration involved when rights are in tension.
30
R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.). Also see Dagenais v.
Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.).
31
M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] S.C.J. No. 13, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), per McLachlin J. (as
she then was).
32
[2004] S.C.J. No. 75, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at para. 46 (S.C.C.). The Court pointed out
that there were no submissions explaining how same-sex marriage contravened equality rights and
that the Court was unable to “surmise” how it could.
33
Id., at para. 51.
34
Id., at para. 58.
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Amselem, in which Jewish owners of condominiums wanted to place
succahs on their balconies during Succot, contrary to a condominium bylaw requiring balconies to be kept clear, was decided under the Quebec
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.35 Justice Iacobucci, for the
majority, stated that the interests of the co-owners in “preserving the
aesthetic appearance of the balconies” as part of the enjoyment of their
property “cannot be reconciled with a total ban imposed on the
appellants‟ exercise of their religious freedom”.36 Justice Bastarache,
however, viewed the situation rather differently, insisting that Amselem‟s
freedom of religion and the other co-owners‟ right to “peaceful enjoyment
and free disposition of [their] property” (protected under section 6 of
the Quebec Charter), and their right to life and security (protected by
section 1 of the Quebec Charter), “must be reconciled”.37 In the end, they
are not reconciled, because Bastarache J. concluded that “since Mr.
Amselem‟s right to freedom of religion cannot be exercised in harmony
with the rights and freedoms of others or with the general well-being, the
infringement of Mr. Amselem‟s right is legitimate” and the prohibition
against building structures on the balconies does not violate his freedom
of religion.38 Reconciliation requires everyone in a multicultural society
to exercise tolerance, including claimants, in this case Mr. Amselem. It
may have been a factor in Bastarache J.‟s opinion that the Syndicat had
offered a compromise involving a communal succah that the claimants
initially accepted, but later rejected.39
Bruker v. Marcovitz, also under the Quebec Charter, provides
another example of an attempt to reconcile rights using societal interests
under section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter.40 In Bruker, a divorcing
husband and wife agreed to obtain a get. Subsequently, the husband
refused to take the necessary steps and many years later, the wife sued
for damages. The husband contended that the contract was not valid
under Quebec law (a position upheld by Deschamps J. in dissent) and
that granting the wife damages would infringe his freedom of religion.
Justice Abella, for the majority, noted that “[s]ection 9.1 confirms the
principle that the assertion of a claim to religious freedom must be
35
Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Amselem”].
36
Id., at para. 86.
37
Id., at para. 165. Life and security were an issue because the succahs could block using
the balconies as an exit in an emergency.
38
Id., at para. 180.
39
Id., at paras. 176-177.
40
Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (S.C.C.).
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reconciled with countervailing rights, values, and harm”41 and “Mr.
Marcovitz‟s claim must therefore be weighed against the „democratic
values, public order and the general well-being of the citizens of Québec‟
stipulated by s. 9.1”,42 a weighing in which Mr. Marcovitz “has little to
put on the scales”.43 Interests that include “protecting equality rights, the
dignity of Jewish women in their independent ability to divorce and
remarry” and the public interest in enforcing contracts outweighed the
religious freedom in this case.44
Amselem, as a case involving private parties with no government
nexus, could not have been a Canadian Charter case. Bruker v. Marcovitz
could have been considered under the Charter only if Mr. Marcovitz had
challenged the provision in the Divorce Act prohibiting using a religious
process as a bar against remarriage.45 Had a Canadian Charter analysis
been appropriate, however, carried out at the rights stage it would have
permitted consideration of the life and security interest in Amselem and
the equality interest in Bruker v. Marcovitz, but not the enjoyment of
property in the former and the public interest in the observance of
contractual obligations in both. Reconciliation could have resulted in a
compromise in Amselem in the form of a communal succah, but in
Bruker v. Marcovitz, one right would almost certainly have had to take
priority over the other. Section 1, on the other hand, could encompass all
these interests.
3. Immunity from Charter Challenges: de Jure and de Facto?
There have been cases in which the choice between reconciliation at
the rights stage or a section 1 balancing is moot, since the right is
immune from Charter challenge. For example, the guarantee of
denominational schools in section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867
precludes challenges to separate schools by members of other religions.46
41

Id., at para. 77.
Id., at para. 78.
43
Id., at para. 79. He has little to put on the scales, in Abella J.‟s view, because he
voluntarily signed the contract.
44
Id., at para. 92.
45
Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 21.1.
46
Reference re Bill 30, An Act to amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] S.C.J. No. 44,
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Bill 30”]. Also see Adler v. Ontario, [1996]
S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 (S.C.C.). Nevertheless, there remains some question whether s.
93 should be read “simply” as protecting denominational schools established at the time of
Confederation from being abolished by the government or as preventing challenges by “newer”
religions or religions that lacked the same status as those whose schools were guaranteed by s. 93.
42
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Similarly, in Kapp, Bastarache J. states that the Charter cannot be
interpreted as making “the exercise of powers [that would be protected
by section 25] consistent with the purposes of s. 91(24)” unconstitutional.47
These are cases in which state action acquires immunity from Charter
challenge and thus is absolutist in nature. These cases provide a model of
sorts for the analysis of section 15(2) and section 25 in Kapp.
In some ways, however, the rights stage reconciliation approach may
have the same result. Thus, for example, the Code in Trinity Western is
in effect immune from challenge under section 1548 (as opposed to
actions taken that are reliant on the views underlying the Code). There is
therefore no significant consideration required about how a written code
might have an effect on equality rights because of the message that it
delivers about the “human dignity” of the targeted group. This might be
contrasted with the Court‟s comment in Butler, that women feel
degraded “as „victims‟ of the message of obscenity”.49 In Keegstra, the
majority commented, “It is indisputable that the emotional damage caused
by words may be of grave psychological and social consequence.”50 Thus
one might have looked at the conflicting rights at issue in Trinity Western
differently. There is no dispute that sexual orientation is a protected
ground of equality, with the inference that persons claiming this ground
have been disadvantaged in the past and may continue to be
disadvantaged. Part of that disadvantage has been the beliefs underlying
discrimination and, in some instances, hate expression towards the gay
and lesbian (and more broadly, the lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgendered or “LGBT”) community. Expressions that reflect or
perpetuate those beliefs are detrimental to the goal of equality for the
LGBT community. Thus the rights at issue could be framed as the right,
on the basis of religious belief, to harm members of a group by
assumptions and words about their moral worth and the equality right not
to be the subject of words that might cause “damage … of grave
psychological and social consequence”.

47

Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 121.
This is not only because Trinity Western is a private institution, but because Trinity
Western is entitled to hold these religious views without there being an assumption that its students
will actually discriminate against gays and lesbians.
49
R. v. Butler, supra, note 27, at para. 117.
50
Keegstra, supra, note 13, at para. 60.
48
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III. COMPARING THE ANALYSIS IN KAPP
Where does Kapp fit into this jurisprudence? Kapp raises issues
about the relationship between subsections 15(1) and 15(2), and between
section 25 and all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. To
what extent are there potential conflicts or tensions in these relationships
and is the analysis of each of these issues in Kapp consistent with
previous jurisprudence on reconciliation and balancing?
As part of the federal Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy, the federal
government established three pilot sales programs; under one of these
programs, it issued an exclusive communal fishing licence to three
Aboriginal Bands that permitted the Bands to designate fishers to fish for
salmon over a period of 24 hours and sell their catch.51 Otherwise, the
Bands did not have a recognized Aboriginal right to sell fish.52 Fishers
excluded from fishing during this period fished and were charged with
fishing at a prohibited time. The trial judge accepted their contention that
the licence breached the non-Aboriginal fishers‟53 equality rights and was
not justified under section 1; the Crown appealed successfully and the
Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.54
1. The Majority’s Section 15(2) Analysis
The Chief Justice and Abella J., for all the members of the Court but
Bastarache J. (who appears, however, to agree with the analysis), found
that the licence was an affirmative action program under section 15(2) of
the Charter; consequently, there was no contravention of the nonAboriginal fishers‟ equality rights. They held that where a program
satisfies the requirements of section 15(2), it will not constitute
51

Some of the fishers the Bands designated were licensed commercial fishers: Kapp, supra,
note 2, at para. 8.
52
R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.), but see as well R.
v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at para. 7 (S.C.C.): recognizing a treaty right
to sell fish for “necessaries” or a “moderate livelihood”, not “open-ended accumulation of wealth”, a
right that can be regulated by the federal government.
53
The trial judge stayed the proceedings: [2003] B.C.J. No. 1772, [2003] 4 C.N.L.R. 238
(B.C. Prov. Ct.). The commercial fishers who challenged the granting of the licence are described as
“mainly non-aboriginal”: Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 1. There is otherwise no information provided
about the ethnic origins of these fishers in the decision; however, a scan of their names indicates that
they are of various ethnic origins. A failure to explore this further makes it easier to view the
challenging fishers as a homogenous group.
54
[2006] B.C.J. No. 1273, [2006] 3 C.N.L.R. 282 (B.C.C.A.). The Court of Appeal set out
the history of the case, including the successful appeal from the trial decision and imposition of a
fine: [2004] B.C.J. No. 1440, [2004] 3 C.N.L.R. 269 (B.C.S.C.).
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discrimination under section 15(1). Following Lovelace,55 the requirements
of section 15(2) are that one of the purposes of the program is
ameliorative or remedial and that the program is directed at a
disadvantaged group identified by one of the enumerative or analogous
grounds. According to the majority, the program in Kapp targeted a
disadvantaged group on the basis of race. The most important factor in
determining whether a program meets the section 15(2) requirements is
the legislature‟s goal in enacting the program. In this case, although the
government had several reasons for enacting the licence, the majority
found that one of the purposes was to provide economic opportunities to
native Bands and assist them in achieving self-sufficiency, and that the
licence was rationally connected to this goal. This conclusion ended the
inquiry.
The majority‟s view is encapsulated as follows:
That where a program makes a distinction on one of the grounds
enumerated under s. 15 or an analogous ground but has as its object
the amelioration of the conditions of a disadvantaged group, s. 15‟s
guarantee of substantive equality is furthered, and the claim of
discrimination must fail.56

Kapp thus can be said to give vigour to section 15(2) in a way that
Lovelace, the Court‟s previous attempt to interpret section 15(2),57 might
be thought not to have done. Section 15(2) is not there as a caution to
ensure that affirmative action programs will not be viewed as “reverse
discrimination” and therefore unconstitutional. Rather, it has independent
status; section 15(2) does not merely protect affirmative action programs,
it means that they cannot be found to discriminate.
The objective of bringing clarity and substance to the section 15(2)
issue is highly desirable. Jurisprudential consideration of the section has
been confusing and it is important to know whether it is an exception or a
defence to section 15(1), whether it is a cautious protection or an
assertive statement about the legitimacy of a particular tool to advance
equality.58 Notably, Kapp establishes that section 15 must be read
55
Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Lovelace”].
56
Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 3 (emphasis added).
57
Lovelace, supra, note 55.
58
Michael Morris and Joseph Cheng deal in detail with the history and significance of the
way s. 15(2) has been interpreted in their contribution to this volume: Michael H. Morris & Joseph
K. Cheng, “Lovelace and Law Revisited: The Substantive Equality Promise of Kapp” (2009) 47
S.C.L.R. (2d) 281.
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coherently, as a comprehensive whole. It gives significant value to
affirmative action programs as a means of remedying inequality or
achieving substantive equality. In doing so, it brings to fruition in a way
that the federal Employment Equity Act59 has not, the vision underlying
the Report of the Royal Commission on Equality in Employment,
chaired by Judge Rosalie Silberman Abella (as she then was). The
mechanism developed by Commissioner Abella was an approach she
called “employment equity”, affirmative action in a specific context. The
vision giving rise to employment equity transcends the context, however:
it refers to the use of proactive programs as a way of remedying past
discrimination suffered by disadvantaged groups. In the words of section
15(2), a “law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration
of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups”; without exhausting
the groups for whom programs may be developed, they include “those
that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability”.
By reading the section as a whole, protection for affirmative action
programs is no longer at risk of being considered an afterthought, a
caution in response to American constitutional jurisprudence, but an
integral part of substantive equality. These programs provide one tool,
although not the only one, for achieving the promise of section 15(1),
actual equality. Thus McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. develop a holistic
approach to subsections 15(1) and (2), saying that these subsections
“work together as a whole to promote the vision of substantive equality
that underlies s. 15 as a whole”. Subsection 15(1), they explain, is
intended to prevent “discriminatory distinctions”, while subsection 15(2)
allows government to implement “programs aimed at helping disadvantaged
groups improve their situation … without fear of challenge under
s. 15(1)”.60 Or, as the majority later explain,
Under s. 15(1), the focus is on preventing governments from making
distinctions based on the enumerated or analogous grounds that: have
the effect of perpetuating group disadvantage and prejudice; or impose
disadvantage on the basis of stereotyping. Under s. 15(2), the focus is
on enabling governments to pro-actively combat existing discrimination
through affirmative measures.61

59
60
61

S.C. 1995, c. 44.
Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 16.
Id., at para. 25 (emphasis in original).
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It needs to be emphasized that section 15(2) permits affirmative
action programs, but does not require them.62 Thus, once they have
established them, governments may apparently ignore them with relative
impunity.63 Section 15(2) was enacted to avoid challenges to affirmative
action programs from members of advantaged groups, in light of the
history of affirmative action in the United States,64 and it has always
been understood that affirmative action programs do not (necessarily)
constitute impermissible reverse discrimination. The majority acknowledge
that affirmative action programs will “inevitably exclude individuals
from other groups”, but that “[t]his does not necessarily make them
either unconstitutional or „reverse discrimination‟”, since “discriminatory
conduct entail[s] more than different treatment”.65
In Lovelace, the Supreme Court of Canada concluded that the
preferable approach to section 15(2) was to view it as “confirmatory” of
section 15(1) and that claims against affirmative action programs should
first be assessed under section 15(1): “By doing that one can ensure that
the program is subject to the full scrutiny of the discrimination analysis,
as well as the possibility of a s. 1 review.”66 Although it might be argued
that the analysis in Lovelace avoided coming to terms with an adequate
interpretation of section 15(2), it had the merit of requiring that the
program be scrutinized to some extent vis-à-vis other equality claims.
Nevertheless, it concluded the program was acceptable, even though the
claimants were at greater disadvantage than were the beneficiaries of the

62

Quaere, however, whether they might be required as a remedy for a contravention of

s. 15(1).
63
See Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R.
381 (S.C.C.), in which the government of Newfoundland and Labrador argued that the economic
situation required them to delay or breach an agreement to pay women in the health care sector pay
equity adjustments. Finding that this did constitute a contravention of s. 15(1), the Supreme Court
accepted the province‟s contention under s. 1 without any real analysis. Post-Kapp, how would the
tension between the security interests of other people (at least one of the ways societal interests
under section 1 could have been described) and the affirmative action program of pay equity been
resolved? One also wonders whether the result would have been different had the Court ordered pay
equity adjustments in response to a s. 15 challenge.
64
Section 15(2) is intended “to avoid the doubts about affirmative action created by the
Bakke decision”: Dale Gibson, “Accentuating the Positive and Eliminating the Negative: Remedies
for Inequality under the Canadian Charter” in Lynn Smith, ed., Righting the Balance: Canada’s New
Equality Rights (Saskatoon: The Canadian Human Rights Reporter Inc., 1986) 312, at note 55. See
also Lovelace v. Ontario, [1997] O.J. No. 2313, 33 O.R. (3d) 735, at para. 51 (Ont. C.A.). See also
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
65
Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 28 (emphasis on “necessarily” added; emphasis on
“different” in original). The majority relies on Andrews, supra, note 4, for this point.
66
Lovelace , supra, note 55, at para. 108.
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program at issue.67 I note in this regard that the Court in Lovelace clearly
stated that the assessment under section 15(1) or section 15(2) is not
about who is more disadvantaged or in a “race to the bottom”.68
The Lovelace Court left open the possibility that this was not the
only way of viewing section 15(2); it could also be viewed as an
exemption to section 15(1).69 Chief Justice McLachlin and Abella J. take
yet a different route: “[I]f the government can demonstrate that an
impugned program meets the criteria of s. 15(2), it may be unnecessary
to conduct a s. 15(1) analysis at all.”70 Elsewhere they make a stronger
statement, saying that programs that satisfy section 15(2)‟s requirements
“s. 15‟s guarantee of substantive equality is furthered, and the claim of
discrimination must fail”.71 From Lovelace‟s preference for full scrutiny,
Kapp takes us to almost no scrutiny at all. Permission (and thus
encouragement) for the government to implement affirmative action
programs becomes a limit on the analysis under section 15(1): section
15(2) “tell[s] us … that s. 15(1) cannot be read in a way that finds an
ameliorative program aimed at combating disadvantage to be
discriminatory and in breach of s. 15”.72 As a result, any claims that a
program infringes equality rights “must fail” once the program is
determined to be an affirmative action program under section 15(2).73
The Chief Justice and Abella J. develop the test under section 15(2)
(which they allow might be refined in the future) as follows:
A program does not violate the s. 15 equality guarantee if the
government can demonstrate that: (1) the program has an ameliorative
or remedial purpose; and (2) the program targets a disadvantaged group
identified by the enumerated or analogous grounds. 74
67
Ontario had entered into an agreement with First Nations Bands in the province for an
on-reserve casino, with the profits to be distributed among Bands registered under the Indian Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. The claimants, while individually entitled to be or were registered under the
Indian Act, were not registered as collectives and were not eligible to benefit from the program. The
Court held that the program was not discriminatory because the project was more consistent with the
circumstances of registered First Nations Bands than with those of the claimants. The claimants were
not intended to be included in the program.
68
Lovelace, supra, note 55, at paras. 59 and 69.
69
Id., at para. 108.
70
Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 37.
71
Id., at para. 3 (emphasis added).
72
Id., at para. 38.
73
Id., at para. 39. The advantage of this approach is that it avoids “the symbolic problem of
finding a program discriminatory before „saving‟ it as ameliorative”. If the government does not
establish that the program falls within s. 15(2), the program must be reviewed under s. 15(1): id., at
para. 40.
74
Id., at para. 41.
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While the test is focused on the legislative goal, abuse by government
to forestall equality claims by declaring a program has an ameliorative
purpose can be addressed by an examination of whether “the declared
purpose is genuine”. The likely impact of the program becomes less
important than its purpose, since it is desirable that government have
some leeway and be allowed to experiment.75 Even so, the court may
assess whether the means chosen by the legislature is “rationally related
to [the] ameliorative purpose, in the sense that it appears at least
plausible that the program may indeed advance the state goal of
combating disadvantage”.76
Briefly, other aspects of the majority‟s section 15(2) analysis are:
“laws designed to restrict or punish behaviour would not qualify for
s. 15(2) protection”;77 the group affected must be “specific and
identifiable” (thus “broad societal legislation, such as social assistance
programs” would not be protected) and “[n]ot all members of the group
need to be disadvantaged, as long as the group as a whole has
experienced discrimination.”78
The majority‟s approach in Kapp gives section 15(2) real substance.
Although it does not require the government to take proactive affirmative
action measures to promote equality, it makes it far easier for it to do so
without fear of being confronted with sustainable challenges that the
measures contravene the equality rights of advantaged groups. That was
the reason section 15(2) was included in the Charter. As Dickson C.J.C.
said in Edwards Books:
In interpreting and applying the Charter I believe that the courts
must be cautious to ensure that it does not simply become an
instrument of better situated individuals to roll back legislation which
has as its object the improvement of the condition of less advantaged
persons.79

The majority‟s analysis in Kapp and the Court‟s analysis in Lovelace are
intended to protect affirmative action programs designed to improve the
75
Id., at paras. 46 and 47. A program that “has no plausible or predictable ameliorative
effect may render suspect the state‟s ameliorative purpose”: id., at para. 54. An ameliorative program
may exist within a larger scheme; s. 15(2) also protects “distinctions made on enumerated or
analogous grounds that serve and are necessary to the ameliorative purpose”: id., at para. 52.
76
Id., at para. 48. In assessing rationality, however, the court should give deference to the
legislature: id., at para. 49.
77
Id., at para. 54.
78
Id., at para. 55.
79
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at para. 136
(S.C.C.).
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situation of disadvantaged groups from too easy challenge by members
of “better situated individuals”. This is consistent with the Charter‟s
purpose. It is not consistent with the Charter‟s purpose to worsen the
conditions of disadvantaged groups. Lovelace recognized this and
therefore built into the analysis a process for treating challenges by
disadvantaged groups differently from those by advantaged groups,
through more stringent scrutiny of the program. The Kapp majority does
not address this distinction, but it is one that will have to be addressed.
Obviously, affirmative action programs do focus on particular
disadvantaged groups and not all disadvantaged groups will benefit from
it; at least indirectly, these programs could have a negative impact on
other disadvantaged groups, including sub-groups of those benefiting.
This does not mean that the targeted group has suddenly become “better
situated” in the sense meant by Dickson C.J.C. in Edwards; of course,
this is not so. To say that the analysis should recognize and include a
way of assessing this impact does not mean that the program will be
unconstitutional, even if the analysis reveals a negative impact. It will
depend on the program, the benefits and the impact. Will this make it
more complicated than the majority prefers? It will, but we are at the
stage when achieving equality has become, in practice more complex.
We need a clear process for determining the constitutionality of section
15(2) programs, one that gives them full recognition, but this does not
necessarily translate into a simple process.
2. The Approaches to Section 25
While the majority decision gives section 15(2) significant substantive
weight, to the extent that it forecloses any assessment of whether an
affirmative action program might nevertheless discriminate against
another group, creating or exacerbating a disadvantage that outweighs
the benefit of the program to its target group, it expresses reluctance to
grant section 25 the same status. Section 25 states:
25. The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms shall
not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal,
treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the aboriginal peoples
of Canada including
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal
Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and

(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d)

RESILING FROM RECONCILING?

273

(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land claims
agreements or may be so acquired.

Chief Justice McLachlin and Abella J. “question” whether the
licence is even encompassed by section 25, since probably “only rights
of a constitutional character are likely to benefit from s. 25”.80 They are
not satisfied that section 25 is more than an interpretive provision; and if
it is only interpretive, it would not constitute a bar to the claim that the
licence infringes equality rights.
This caution is in marked contrast to Bastarache J.‟s definitive
interpretation, one that does not require a finding that the licence is an
affirmative action program.81 He takes the same approach to section 25
that the majority does to section 15(2): section 25 supersedes section
15(1). In his view, section 25 is a bar to the equality claim; as soon as a
potential conflict between section 25 and section 15 is established, the
analysis shifts to section 25. He rejects the argument that section 25 is
merely interpretive; rather, where laws impair native rights, the laws will
have to give way to section 25 rights. Section 25 shields laws that
distinguish between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people when they are
enacted to protect Aboriginal interests and these include statutory, as
well as constitutional, rights.
I discuss Bastarache J.‟s approach here only to illustrate that the
approach is similar to the majority‟s approach to section 15(2), that is,
the tone of the analysis that on the one hand, provides for a simpler
approach, but on the other, may neglect to address some of the
underlying complications. I do not, for example, address the question of
whether section 25 should extend to laws or programs established by
ordinary statute, or how the analysis might affect the application of
section 25 to provincial statutes or programs, such as the Casino Rama
program that was the subject of Lovelace.
According to Bastarache J., the process for determining whether
section 25 settles the matter is as follows: it is first necessary to establish
a prima facie claim under the Charter right at issue (in Kapp, section 15),
followed by a determination of whether the Aboriginal interest which is
being challenged falls within section 25. If it does, there will then be an
80

Kapp, supra, note 2, at para. 63.
Indeed, Bastarache J. points out that the Attorney General of Canada did not rely on
s. 15(2) and that the programs did not have as their “primary object the amelioration of the
conditions of disadvantaged groups or individuals”, evidently because on Lovelace, the program
would not have complied with s. 15(2): id., at para. 73. For the majority, this is not of any great
importance, since ameliorative objectives need only be one purpose.
81
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assessment of whether there is a “true conflict” between the Charter right
and section 25. This could be another way of asking whether the interests
at issue can be reconciled. Not only is the right here (the granting of the
licence) within section 25, but it is “totally dependent on the exercise of
powers given to Parliament under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act,
1867”, the power over “Indians, and Lands Reserved for Indians”. This
reliance on section 91(24) raises a question about the applicability of
section 25 to provincial programs. Justice Bastarache suggests that laws
that fall under section 88 of the Indian Act, as laws of general
application, would not fall into section 25.82 Would a program such as
the Casino Rama program in Lovelace be encompassed by section 25, or
would it have to satisfy section 15(2) requirements as an affirmative
action program? The Aboriginal right in Kapp is in conflict with section
15(1), since it is not possible to exercise the licence in a manner
consistent with the equality rights of the non-Aboriginal fishers. Thus
section 25 “provides a full answer to the claim”.83
Justice Bastarache contends that “[section] 25 serves the purpose of
protecting the rights of aboriginal peoples where the application of the
Charter protections for individuals would diminish the distinctive,
collective and cultural identity of an aboriginal group”.84
It “reflects [the] imperative need to accommodate, recognize and
reconcile aboriginal interests”,85 the “notions of reconciliation and
negotiation present in the treaty process and recognized by the previous
jurisprudence of this Court”.86 It is “a necessary partner to s. 35(1) [of the
Constitution Act, 1982]; it protects s. 35(1) purposes and enlarges the
reach of measures needed to fulfill the promise of reconciliation”.87 It is
meant to be a protection of difference; like section 15(2) it is vulnerable
to being treated as a way of permitting discrimination. The response to
this vulnerability is different in the two instances. The analysis of section
15(2) tends to shy away from saying it permits discrimination, but
“acceptable discrimination”; section 25 is quite different, since it reflects
the exercise of section 91(24) which “„authorizes the Parliament of
Canada to legislate for the benefit of the Indian population in a

82
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84
85
86
87

Id., at para. 105.
Id., at para. 123.
Id., at para. 89.
Id., at para. 106.
Id., at para. 120.
Id., at para. 121.
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preferential, discriminatory, or distinctive fashion vis-à-vis others‟”.88 In
other words, section 25 protects “discriminatory” programs because they
are designed to protect Aboriginal interests. It reflects the distinct status
of Aboriginal peoples.
Justice Bastarache explains that the general view in the literature,
and the trend in the jurisprudence, has been to see section 25 as a
“shield” rather than as an interpretive provision.89 Nevertheless, the
shield is not absolute, but is restricted by section 28 guaranteeing gender
equality and applies only to laws “that actually impair native rights … ,
not those that simply have incidental effects on natives”.90 This view
appears to be consistent with the wording of section 25. The rights
protected arise from various sources, from treaties and constitutional
commitments and statute: “legislation that distinguishes between aboriginal
and non-aboriginal people in order to protect interests associated with
aboriginal culture, territory, sovereignty or the treaty process deserves to
be shielded from Charter scrutiny”.91 Treaty rights, presumably, will
always be protected, while new rights, under Bastarache J.‟s interpretation,
may not be, since “[s]ection 25 rights are not constitutionalized and can
be taken away [and] Parliament can also make a right subject to the same
protections as those afforded in the Charter by its particular terms.”92 As
long as they exist, however, they will always take priority over other
interests, even, presumably, if a similar objective could be achieved in a
way less exclusionary of other interests (since the program as framed
may result in a conflict, even if another program would not). In this case,
for example, one alternative might have been assisting Aboriginal fishers
not already licence holders to obtain licences and boats; the feasibility of
this and its impact were not before the Court and as with section 15(2),
the Court will not consider alternatives, only the programs it is asked to
assess for constitutionality.
Once a Charter claim has been established and once it has been
established that the native right at issue falls within section 25, it is
necessary to decide whether there is “a true conflict” between the two.93
Justice Bastarache concludes that “[t]he right to equality afforded to
88
89
90
91
92

Id., at para. 121 (S.C.C.), citing Estey J. in Reference re Bill 30, supra, note 46, at 1206.
Id., at paras. 94-96.
Id., at para. 97.
Id., at para. 103.
Id., at para. 100. It must be noted that s. 25 does not create rights, however: id., at para.

118.
93

Id., at para. 111.
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every individual under s. 15 is not capable of application consistently
with the rights of aboriginal fishers holding licences under the Pilot Sales
Program” (which is a right within the meaning of section 25) and thus
“[t]here is a real conflict”.94 Consequently, “[s]ection 25 of the Charter
applies in the present situation and provides a full answer to the claim.”95
3. Strengthening Sections 15(2) and 25: Whither Reconciliation?
It is not my purpose here to critique the majority‟s finding that the
communal fishing licence is an ameliorative program under section
15(2), but rather to question whether a finding that it is an ameliorative
program ends the inquiry, as it does for the majority.96 Nor is it my
concern here whether section 25 should protect the program; rather, it is
whether an approach that forecloses further inquiry is appropriate
Charter analysis. Both judgments use the language of closure, curt and
non-negotiable. Without debating the merits of this particular case,
which may well have had the same result under a different analysis, I
suggest that this approach is inconsistent with, even antithetical to, the
language about and efforts to develop a more nuanced understanding of
how competing rights might be reconciled or balanced. I emphasize that
my reason for raising this issue relates to the impact on other disadvantaged
groups and particularly more disadvantaged sub-groups of the benefited
group. Is it necessary to ignore their interests (for now, one presumes) in
order to protect affirmative action programs and Aboriginal interests
against majority claims?
In this light it is worth returning to the Ontario Court of Appeal‟s
analysis in Lovelace.97 There the Court of Appeal held that “s. 15(2) does
not immunize special programs from constitutional review. Even where
the substance of a program is authorized by s. 15(2), some feature of it
may be discriminatory and thus infringe s. 15(1)”.98 It recognized that
“[t]he language and history of s. 15(2) seem to militate against such
challenges to s. 15(2) programs by members of socially advantaged or
privileged groups,” but also appreciated that challenges could also come
from disadvantaged groups, as was the case in Lovelace itself. Certainly,
this is a more complicated approach. As the Court of Appeal in Lovelace
94
95
96
97
98

Id., at para. 122.
Id., at para. 123.
Id., at para. 61.
Lovelace (C.A.), supra, note 64.
Id., at para. 65.
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said, if a challenge came from a disadvantaged group within the object of
the program, the program would likely be discriminatory and would have
to be justified under section 1. A challenge from a disadvantaged group
outside the object of the program would not be successful and the
inference might be, should not be entertained.99
Affirmative action programs are an important redress for historical
and current discrimination and it is desirable to encourage governments
to establish them in the appropriate case. It is tempting to give
affirmative action a great deal of constitutional weight, just as Aboriginal
rights have constitutional weight. It is crucial if they are to be successful
that governments be able to experiment with programs that might not
ultimately be successful. Similarly, equality claims from the majority
should not be allowed to undermine or abrogate Aboriginal rights. An
analysis that cuts off equality and possibly other claims from members of
majority groups is therefore appealing.
That said, neither section 15(2) nor section 25 is a rights-granting
section, although one can make the link between section 25 of the
Charter and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982100 so that section 25
incorporates section 35 rights and therefore protects them from challenge.
Assuming for the moment that section 25 encompasses benefits
established by ordinary statute, the question that is effectively foreclosed
by Bastarache J.‟s analysis is whether there might be some cases where
the application of section 25 to statutory entitlements requires a more
nuanced analysis to ensure that new statutory entitlements in particular
might not have a negative impact on disadvantaged groups. Similarly, the
majority‟s analysis of section 15(2) does not allow for a situation in
which an affirmative action program has a negative impact on a subgroup of the disadvantaged group that is the target of the program, that
is, makes the sub-group‟s situation worse. To allow that this could
warrant an appropriate review of the program is not to diminish the
importance of affirmative action programs; nor is it meant to encourage
detailed second-guessing of the program. It is to recognize that section
15(2) is ultimately about remedies and not rights and that it is desirable
that remedies even for disadvantaged groups do not result in greater
disadvantage for other disadvantaged groups, at least not without some
scrutiny.
99
Id., at paras. 65, 67 and 68. Even though the claimants in Lovelace were disadvantaged,
they were not successful in their claim at the Court of Appeal or at the Supreme Court of Canada.
100
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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Kapp itself did not require the Court to consider whether it would
have developed the same clear-cut approach had the claimants been
disadvantaged. As Sarah Kraicer observes, the claimants in Kapp
specifically stated in their factum that “the trial judge had been correct to
find that „no member of the claimant group can claim pre-existing
disadvantage, stereotyping or prejudice‟”.101 As Kraicer asks, would it
have mattered had the “protest fishers” been Métis or persons of
Japanese heritage? Yet the surnames of some of the claimants at least
suggest that they come from communities that have suffered disadvantage
in the past.102 Perhaps the protest fishers‟ self-identification precluded
any serious assessment of who was advantaged and disadvantaged;
regardless, it made it easier to avoid any factual analysis of that type.

IV. CONCLUSION
The analysis under both section 15(2) and section 25 might have
been appropriate in Kapp, setting aside for the moment whether treating
the difference as one based on race was itself legitimate. (In this respect,
viewing the program as an “Aboriginal right” may be more satisfying
than characterizing it as an “affirmative action program”.) What is
troubling is the willingness of both the majority and Bastarache J. to use
the language of closure, of finality, of language that comes close to
granting immunity from scrutiny on the difficult question these situations
raise: how do we take into account the impact on more disadvantaged
members of the targeted group who are not included in the program?
Perhaps the fear (and reality) of attack by majority groups warrants the
Kapp approach.
In the end, perhaps, one flaw of both judgments in Kapp is that they
seek to make the law simple through prioritizing rights, when the
realities that the law applies to are far from simple. While complex
analyses can be difficult to apply, frustrating the goal of advancing
equality or Aboriginal rights, and resulting too often in confusing
jurisprudence,103 the answer is not always to strip the analysis of nuances
that are fundamental to the guarantee. Efforts to reconcile and balance
101
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may often be unnecessarily complex and are often far from satisfying;
they do, however, try to grapple with what is a complicated world of
rights. As Abella J. has explained in relation to section 9.1 of the Quebec
Charter:
Determining when the assertion of a right based on difference must
yield to a more pressing public interest is a complex, nuanced, factspecific exercise that defies bright-line application. It is, at the same
time, a delicate necessity for protecting the evolutionary integrity of
both multiculturalism and public confidence in its importance. 104

This complexity is true under the Charter, not only for multiculturalism,
but for other broad societal commitments to individual rights and
remedies. The strength of the Charter lies in its capacity to help us
negotiate the tensions inherent in a pluralist society. The two analyses in
Kapp in their own ways seek to locate the proactive advancement of
disadvantaged groups squarely within that capacity. This is laudable.
Nevertheless, by seeking to minimize the potential for challenges from
majority groups, both also risk excluding even consideration of the
experience of sub-groups of the beneficiaries who are even more
disadvantaged. The facts in Kapp mean that this issue might still be
addressed in future cases, despite the language in Kapp itself, with
respect to section 15(2). The status of Bastarache J.‟s section 25
interpretation, and the majority‟s reluctance to concur, leaves open the
question of whether the shield will operate against only non-Aboriginal
claims or against those brought by other Aboriginal groups whose
situation may be more dire than those who have acquired rights. Or is it a
question of everyone waiting their turn?
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